A LETTER FROM A Member of the Oppoſition TO LORD B----.

[Price One Shilling.]

BRITISH MUSEUM

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Quoth *Hudibras*, you lie ſo ope
That I, without a Teleſcope—
————Eaſily can vie,
Where you tell Truth, and where you lie.
HUD.

LONDON:

Printed for G. BURNET, at Biſhop Burnet's-Head, in the Strand. MDCCLXIII.

A

LETTER

FROM A

Member of the Opposition

TO

LORD B——.

BRITISH MUSEUM

A

LETTER, &c.

My LORD,

YOU may, perhaps, be ſurpriſed at this public addreſs, after ſo long a ſilence. But as I find the advocates of your party have lately raiſed their voices high againſt us, I think it is time to anſwer their charge, in the ſame manner they have attacked us; and as they have liſted under your banner, I know no where ſo proper to apply as to the head-quarters.

Were I to enter into all the *minutiæ* of your adm——n, and the meaſures you have purſued, which has given riſe to the preſent oppoſition, I ſhould ſwell this letter into a volume; and muſt therefore leave them to your future biographer, who, in giving your character at length, will neceſſarily blazon our glory; to dwell upon ſuch facts as have

been ſo ſtrikingly obvious, and ſo manifeſtly prejudicial to the nation, that every eye has been witneſs to their effects, and every tongue has re-ecchoed the diſapprobation of.

We are charged with *perſonal diſguſt and national antipathy, as the principal foundations whereon we have raiſed the fabric of our oppotion—that it is not particular meaſures, but particular men, that we diſlike—and that we have a good employment more at heart than a good peace.*

Had we not concurred with you in all your meaſures in the beginning of your adm——n, without teſtifying the leaſt diſapprobation, either to your perſon, or your country—had we not applauded every expedient that was deviſed, and partook of their ſucceſs—and had not *moſt of us* reſigned our employments at a time, when no others were vacant that *we could reaſonably expect* would fall to our ſhare; ſuch accuſations might bear at leaſt the ſemblance of probability: But theſe are facts ſo notoriouſly known, that they only require being mentioned, to be inconteſtably proved, and evince the falſity of our enemies inſinuations.

The object of Mr. P—'s reſignation was ſo manifeſt to all the world, that it is amazing any writers, however ſervily diſpoſed to vilify, could ever attribute it to any other cauſe, than the diſapprobation of the meaſure he ſo earneſtly

earneſtly recommended, and which he ſo *evidently proved*, to be the only expedient, for giving a greater luſtre to our arms, and more permanent ſecurity to our conſtitution, in church and ſtate—I mean a declaration of war againſt Spain in October 1761. This was rejected—he foreſaw all the diſhonour and misfortunes that would neceſſarily accrue from this inattention. Notwithſtanding the propoſal was approved the enſuing month, notwithſtanding his —— rewarded him with a handſome penſion for his paſt ſervices, and a title for thoſe of his wife —He foreſaw the loſs of Newfoundland, and the preſent (What ſhall I call it?) peace; and would therefore no longer have the guidance of that adm——n, whoſe luſtre might have been tarniſhed by ſuch inglorious events.

When I ſay Mr. P— foreſaw the loſs of Newfoundland, I do not mean *that he wiſhed it*, to give a colour to planning an oppoſition, which till then there was little or no pretext for (ſave the non-declartaion of war againſt Spain in October inſtead of November). Far be that from *me*, or any of us, who form the preſent antiminiſterial party; I only mean, that there being no other fortifications raiſed during the whole war, and to the end of his reſplendent adm——n, or any more men of war kept upon that ſtation, during that pe-

riod, than at the time of its being *ſurrendered* to the French, he had reaſon to be apprehenſive of its diſmemberment from the firſt commencement of hoſtilities—and he had alſo reaſon to think himſelf very lucky the event did not happen whilſt he was at the head of affairs; not that it could have been imputed as any crime to ſo popular a m——r, for the nation to have ſuſtained one loſs (even though we had never regained it) after ſuch ſignaliſed and repeated ſucceſſes: but his glory might hereby have been diminiſhed, and the people might have perceived, or imagined they perceived, infallibility was not the lot of any man, and the *Patriot* could not always *conquer*.

It is true, the retaking of this iſland, in ſome meaſure, wiped off the ſlur of negligence and inattention which you, my Lord, ſo greatly merited, in not having more *ſeaſonably* provided for the defence of that valuable poſſeſſion, at a time you *ought* to have been acquainted with the deſigns of the French thereupon, though four frigates only might have taken it. And it is to this inſight of all the operations of the French navy, which we were ſo minutely acquainted with during Mr. P—'s adminiſtration, that we may attribute his *intentional remiſſneſs*, (or, in other words, *national œconomy*) in not fortifying and ſecuring that iſland; being certain that

no ſhips could be deſtined againſt it, though they might accidentally eſcape out of Breſt, whilſt our fleet in the Bay ſo compleatly blocked up the French navy.

But when any the leaſt merit is imputed to the retaking of Newfoundland, it ſhould be remembered, that no perſon in England could participate of it, as there was no plan laid here for ſuch an attempt. The Americans atchieved it, and therefore engroſs all the honour. Upon the ſame principles, the then m——y were, in every ſenſible man's eye, exculpated from the ſhame attending the ſurrender of Minorca and Braddock's defeat. Blakeney never received any orders to capitulate, nor in all likelihood would, if he had held out ſix months longer; nor did the American commander follow his inſtructions from home. So that there is ſcarce any prince or miniſter in Europe, except the King of Pruſſia, that is anſwerable for their generals conduct, as circumſtances muſt neceſſarily vary the execution of the plan of operations, however well laid; and ſcope muſt be left for the judgment of a commander upon the ſpot. The King of Pruſſia being moſt frequently with the active part of his army, is an exception to this; and to the want of this allowance to the Imperial generals, whoſe inſtructions muſt be tenaciouſly followed, we may impute many of their defeats;

feats; as they are obliged to ſend to Vienna for freſh orders upon every the leaſt alteration of affairs, and to wait for the return of the courier, though they may in the mean time have the fineſt opportunity of charging the enemy to advantage. This they have as frequently loſt, and with it a battle, inſtead of gaining a victory.

If it ſhould be aſked, as the m——y derive no merit, then, from the recovery of this iſland, how were they blameable for its loſs? The anſwer is ready, becauſe they ſhould have ſecured it from any attempts of the enemy; or, if they left it in the ſame defenceleſs ſtate they found it, without its being attacked for ſix years; becauſe they did not procure intelligence of the deſtination of every frigate that ſailed from France, or any of the iſlands belonging to that crown, and becauſe *individuals* ſuffered by its being a ſhort time in the hands of the French, and individuals have a right to complain; and no man has ever yet thought himſelf *unauthoriſed* to abuſe a m——, or condemn a meaſure, that did not chime in with his particular intereſt.

Though the m——y derived no *perſonal* merit from the retaking of Newfoundland, and ſuffered greatly in their reputation by its loſs; yet the ſlur thrown upon them was in ſome meaſure wiped off by this recovery,

—with

—with what reaſon I will not pretend to determine. No ſooner was that iſland in the hands of the enemy, and the report of a peace being upon the carpet, but the *policy* of the m——r was ſeen through, in yielding up Newfoundland to the French, that they might reſtore it to us as an apparent equivalent for Cape Breton, or perhaps Canada. This your Lordſhip was publickly accuſed of. You alone know the ſincerity of your intentions; and if you have derived no merit from our being ſo early repoſſeſſed of it, you have at leaſt thereby caſt off this imputation. But as we are to look upon the recovery as an accidental ſtroke, *planned without your knowledge*, and *atchieved without your deſire*; ſo the impartial world cannot perceive any other honour you derive from it, but that of having it put out of your power to play this political humbug with the court of Verſailles.

Thus, my Lord, you ſee, that, on whatever ſide we view the loſs of Newfoundland, all the blame, all the negligence, all the diſhonour, will reſt upon your Lordſhip, without any part of it falling upon Mr. P—, or any of his coadjutors.

This, then, was certainly one of the principal cauſes of our reſigning our employments; for though we were convinced of your Tory principles, and your being a Scotchman, we had nevertheleſs till now

united

united with you, acted in concert in the ſame adm——n, and believed you an honeſt man. As you never pretended to ſupport *indefeaſible hereditary right*, gave the leaſt glance of bringing in the pretender, but ſeemed the moſt ſtrenuous of any courtier for the Proteſtant cauſe, and the houſe of Hanover, we had no room to think you a Jacobite. You entertained no high notions of arbitrary power; but juſtly conſidered our conſtitution compoſed of the three ſtates, King, Lords, and Commons, without whoſe concurrent aid no law could be framed, no ſupplies could be granted. The liberties of the people you ſeemed to have a juſt and valuable ſenſe of, and at the ſame time conſidered it neceſſary to ſupport the legal prerogative of the crown. Theſe, which we found the prevalent principles of the modern Tories, we could diſcover no impropriety in; and, though we profeſſed ourſelves Whigs, we thought a coalition of parties under theſe circumſtances was no way incompatible. If it ſhould be aſked, as we made part of the Tory adm——n for a time, were we not become Tories? No; we had blended the parties in ſo nice and curious a manner, that it was difficult to diſcover where the *Whig ended*, or where the *Tory began*. But we were nevertheleſs Whigs—ſtaunch Whigs—which we now approve ourſelves, in oppoſing every ſtep of the Tory adm——n

adm——n which is not thus *properly leavened.*

Should this carry the face of any ſeeming contradiction, let it be remembered, that parties are only names; that a man's actions conſtitute him a good or a bad man—As long as the firſt characteriſe him, he is to be eſteemed and aſſociated with, let his political principles go by whatever title they may; but if the latter ſhould diſtinguiſh him, it is not his being called a *Whig* that will recommend him to the honeſt part of mankind. Bolingbroke was by turns both Whig and Tory, and he was equally deſpiſed by both—More recent examples might be produced. But to the point.

I ſay, my Lord, as your political principles ſo nearly chimed in with our's, we thought it no blot in our eſcutcheon, to make part of a Tory adm——n, though we profeſſed ourſelves Whigs, as long as the meaſures you purſued were ſuited to thoſe profeſſions, and tended to the good of your country; but when we found you even negligent in one part of the world to the defence of our valuable poſſeſſions, and even attentive in another to terms of pacification, which we could not expect (in the beginning of a Spaniſh war) could yet be very honourable for us—we thought it was time to take ourſelves out of the Tory adm——n, and profeſs ourſelves Whigs.

Venal and *corrupt adminiſtrations*, are ſo much the phraſeology of diſappointed ambition, that though I could prove that of your Lordſhip's both the one and the other, I ſhould be loth to attempt the taſk, leſt it ſhould be ſuſpected I gave up my ſhare in it, becauſe my authority was limited, or my rapacity circumſcribed; as it might be ſhrewdly ſuſpected that my extent of power being called in queſtion, or the war being nearly at an end, whereby the pecuniary profits of my office would be greatly leſſened, I was diſguſted with the infraction, or thought myſelf qualified for other departments of more future value and importance. No, my Lord, far from this; I will give you all your due; avarice is the leaſt of your vices: to evince this, we need recur only to that part of your adm——n, when you filled the poſt of S——y of St—e, and ſo beneficently diminiſhed your own revenue to increaſe that of your clerks to double their ſalary. Your ample fortune certainly ſets you above any mean artifices to amaſs riches; and if you cannot *live upon an egg a day*, as a great orator declared in an honourable houſe, *he could*, in order to prove his patriotiſm, and the ſmall influence pecuniary advantages could have upon him; you certainly may have as much reaſon to deſpiſe money, and have the good of your country at

at heart, as your own private ſtake is to the full as great as his.

You ſee, my Lord, I make you all the allowances that can reaſonably be expected from an adverſary. I exculpate you from avarice, and want of generoſity; nor do I directly tax you with *venality* and *corruption*; but that part of your *political principles* ſo immediately connected with the great rule of your adm——n, now become ſo glaring, is what can never be reconciled with ſound Whiggiſm, is what can never be approved by true Engliſhmen, and the real *lovers* of their country. What I mean, my Lord, is, that *unbounded prerogative* you allow your Sov—n, to appoint his own officers, and continue them in poſt as long as ſuits his pleaſure: this the Whigs have ſtrenuouſly and effectually oppoſed ever ſince the houſe of Hanover came to the throne, down to the preſent time. It is impoſſible for a Prince to acquaint himſelf with the paſſions, diſpoſitions, and abilities of individuals, who always appear in maſk before the throne, ſo as to chuſe thoſe who are the propereſt qualified for filling poſts of conſequence; and with regard to inferior employs, it is ſtill more impracticable: ſo that it is properly the province of a ſagacious m——r, or his coadjutors, to ſelect ſuitable objects, make their ap-

pointments, and regulate their poſts. No man was ever better qualified for this province than Sir Robert W——e, who never let his maſter have the leaſt trouble upon his hands in theſe reſpects: but having people of integrity and capacity always ready, he filled up every place as it became vacant with the utmoſt eaſe, diſpatch, and propriety. Hence that good order and harmony which ſubſiſted during the greateſt part of his adm——n; hence that expedition in buſineſs of a public and *private* nature; hence that national œconomy upon every occaſion — that good underſtanding at home and abroad, but particularly the latter ſo clearly manifeſted upon the moſt important occaſions—elections! and hence that unuſual acquieſcence to every meaſure propoſed by the m——r, and ſecured by a maj—ty!

Theſe were ſome of the many advantages derived to the nation from the limitation of prerogative by the Whigs. His ſucceſſor Mr. P—, who followed the footſteps of Sir Robert in every thing that tended to the public good, was equally aſſiduous in taking off all trouble and care from his maſter in theſe appointments and nominations; and had not his death (which every honeſt Whig may lament) that has ſince occaſioned ſo many changes and innovations, unluckily happened, we might ſtill have ſeen things

conducted

conducted in this happy courſe. It muſt, however, be acknowledged, that, even in his days, there were envious courtiers, who would ſometimes tingle in the ears of their maſter, that he ſubmitted himſelf entirely to the government of his m——r; and that his late M——y once went ſo far as to promiſe the Duke of R—— a ſmall poſt for a perſon he had recommended; the vacancy was however filled up by Mr. P— in favour of his *able* friend. The Duke took an opportunity of reminding his M——y of his promiſe, who frankly acknowledged, *That King G— had promiſed it to his Grace, but that King P—m had given it to another.*

From this time his M—y never attempted to nominate for any employment, and P—m, with his confederates, were ſecure of every poſt of honour or profit, from Lord Ch—r down to the loweſt branch of the Exciſe-Office. This deſpotiſm, it is true, they carried with ſomewhat too high a hand; and it were to be wiſhed, for the honour of the Whigs, that the *general reſignation in one day*, when the late rebellion was at its criſis, did not find a place in the annals of our times. Had they not before ſo manifeſtly proved their attachment to the h—e of H——, their enemies might have given ſome groundleſs inſinuations not highly favourable of their

zeal

zeal to the Proteſtant cauſe, and the preſent happy eſtabliſhment.

All the happy effects of this limitation of prerogative are at an end—Your maſter appoints his own ſervants, and you have lately inſtilled ſuch notions of power in him, that he thinks he has a right to keep you at his elbow, in deſpite of all the repreſentations that have been made againſt you, in deſpite of all the hideous characters that have been drawn of you, in writing and prints, in deſpite of all inſinuations to your diſadvantage, with regard to your intimacy with the———, —in deſpite of the Whigs—in deſpite of the oppoſition.

This, my Lord, is one of thoſe alarming circumſtances, that has raiſed ſo many enemies to your adm———n: had there not been a new bridge erected over the Tweed, or had not you yourſelf been born in Scotland, I very much queſtion whether you could have eſcaped cenſure from the Whigs, as ſoon as the fundamental principles which lay for ſome time dormant, was ſo compleatly manifeſted.

At ſo critical a period, was it not the higheſt pitch of imprudence in your Lordſhip to ſet on foot a negotiation between us and France, for bringing about a peace? Was it not flying in the face of the *oppoſition*, to publiſh the preliminaries at the beginning of the

the ſeſſion, before the ſupplies for the enſuing year were granted? Could you expect them to be ſilently read, without being canvaſſed or criticiſed? Had we not the negotiation of the preceding year before us, with which we might compare, and at all events draw concluſions in favour of the terms offered in 1761, though then rejected? Had we not the *ultimatum* and the *uti poſſidetis* to recur to, whereby we might prove that a peace would have been more eligible laſt year than now? However far advanced the negotiation might have been, it was the higheſt pitch of raſhneſs to divulge the ſecret till the cloſe of the ſeſſion, when all the buſineſs was over: the members had then retired to their ſylvan paſtimes, and would have forgot the terms of pacification by that time they met again. The curioſity of the people would have ſubſided; the worſt peace that could have been made, would have been but a nine days wonder; the ſupplies for the current year would have been abundantly granted, and every thing would have been conducted without debate or animoſity.

But, as you have riſqued the publication of the ſums at this period, every body, in and out of doors, will canvas them; every body will condemn them. Though the primary object of the war, that is, aſcertaining the

the limits of our North American Colonies, and ſecuring them from future incurſions, is more than compaſſed, by our retaining all Canada, and that part of Louiſiana, extending from the Apalachean mountains to the river Miſſiſippi: though we have alſo acquired and retained Cape Breton, the Dunkirk of America, and key to the Gulph of St. Laurence; though we have divided the neutral iſlands in our favour, and gained Granada and the Grenadillas therewith; — added Florida, as a barrier to our continential poſſeſſions in America, have gained the liberty of cutting logwood without interruption at Honduras and Campeachy, and poſſeſs that valuable acquiſition of the iſland of Senegal, and therewith the trade of the whole river of the ſame name in Africa: no body can diſpute that we have made conceſſion, greatly inglorious, highly diſhonourable: it is in vain to urge with your partiſans, it is the beſt peace England ever made, and call upon the negotiation of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, to compare the terms of the definitive treaty of 1748 with thoſe of 1762. Our affairs were then very differently ſituated from what they are at preſent; and though we had then made ourſelves maſters of Cape Breton, it was our only conqueſt: it is true we gave it up, and ſent hoſtages to bind the bargain; but what was the reſtitution of a

ſingle

ſingle place, compared to that of the valuable iſlands of Martinico and Guadalupe? As to the noble Lords who went as ſureties for the execution of that article, they were treated with the greateſt reſpect at Verſailles, and not thrown into the Baſtile, as the ſcandalous prints of thoſe times ſuggeſted.

The advocates for the preliminaries lay great ſtreſs upon our being repaid the charge we have been at in ſupporting the French priſoners during the war, as an object that was not in the leaſt attended to in the former negotiation; and they take for granted, the court of Verſailles gives up all claim to the captures made before the declaration of war, becauſe no mention is made of them in the preliminary articles, though Mr. Buſſy ſo ſtrongly inſiſted upon this point in 1761.

We have been repeatedly aſſured from various hands, that the preliminaries made public do not contain all the terms that were ſigned at Fontainbleau the 3d of November, and ſince ratified; but that there are ſeveral other articles kept ſecret, ſome of which have, however, tranſpired in the political world, and amongſt theſe is the proviſion of indemnification we are to make the French for the above-mentioned captures. Some inſinuate, that the other ſecret articles regard the diſpoſitions that are to take place in favour of the King of Pruſſia and the Queen

of Hungary in Germany; but the more ſanguine anti-pacific-inveſtigators inſiſt upon it, that they relate to other reſtitutions, or ceſſions that we are to make to France and Spain, and which you, my Lord, did not dare publickly avow.

If this is the caſe, you have made a fine piece of work of it indeed; and as ſooner or later the nature and tendency of thoſe ſecret articles will come out, what do you imagine will then be the conſequence?—There is but one argument that leads me to think theſe ſuggeſtions may be premature, and that is, if your Lordſhip had intended to have dealt thus underhandedly with the people, it certainly would have occurred to you, that there was no reaſon for publiſhing the reſtitution of Martinico and Guadalupe, or indeed any part of the preliminaries; at leaſt till the cloſe of the ſeſſions, when the ſupplies being granted, as in full time of war, if this indemnification for the French captures made before the declaration of war had been to take place, you might eaſily have drawn it out of the ſurplus of the grants for 1763, without the leaſt noiſe being made about it.

To ſupport the argument, then, we will ſuppoſe that no other reſtitutions or ceſſions are to take place, but thoſe mentioned in the public preliminaries; are they not ſufficient

to

to ſtigmatiſe this nation for ever as thick-ſculled negotiators? Do they not corroborate what we have been ſo often rallied upon, that, let us gain ever ſo many victories over the French in the field, they always conquer us in the cabinet? Not but I think we retain land and iſlands enough in America; for I ſee no likelihood of our ſettling all Canada, and that tract of land between our back ſettlements and the Miſſiſſipi, or indeed of what ſervice it would be, without we had a mind to make our colonies rival the mother-country in power and riches, which many patriots and politicians have long been apprehenſive of, before we were in poſſeſſion of ſuch a great extent of territory. Were land the only object of war and conqueſt, we need not go ſo far as America; we have ſome hundred miles of good ſoil in Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, which remain uncultivated, for no other reaſon, that I could ever find, except it were the want of hands, or a proper ſpirit of induſtry being excited amongſt the people. Either of theſe cauſes will occaſion our new acquiſitions in North America remaining a deſert. And as to iſlands in America, if we had been in want of them, I apprehend the Bahamas, ſo numerous, and, I doubt not, fruitful, if properly cultivated, would not have remained ſo long in our poſſeſſion, with-

out being ſettled, or made any uſe of, by the Engliſh.

Hence, my Lord, it will appear the reſtitutions we have made do not ſo much affect our intereſt as our honour. It would have been glorious for us to have made a peace upon the baſis of an *uti poſſidetis*. It would have deterred the French from ever inſulting us again, and kept all the powers of Europe in awe, leſt they ſhould have incurred our diſpleaſure, and ſuſtained ſuch loſſes as they would have had no hopes of regaining.

The writers who attempt to ſupport the meaſures you have purſued, pretend the greateſt regard has been paid, in framing the preliminaries in queſtion, to the trade and commerce of Great Britain; that new branches are hereby ſtruck out in every quarter of the globe, and new channels opened to the remoteſt, and as yet unknown parts of America. This they attempt to exemplify in our acquiſition of Canada, which they aſſure ſecures us all the fur and beaver trade of that quarter of the world, and enables us to fabricate various branches of manufactures wherein they enter, at a much cheaper rate than we could before, whereby we ſhall not only rival all the other commercial powers of Europe in the peltry trade of North America alone, but alſo in all thoſe other manufactures whereof they make a part, by being enabled

to

to underſell them at foreign markets. They then endeavour to point out the immediate advantages reſulting from our being in poſſeſſion of the iſland of Senegal, which gives us the command of the trade of the whole river of that name, and the country adjacent, and pretend we ſhall ſave near half a million yearly in the ſingle article of gum, which we uſed to pay to foreigners, beſides the negroe, tooth and gold-duſt trades, which are carried on from thence. They then ſtretch away to the continent of South America, and talk loudly of the benefits which will accrue to us from the unlimited permiſſion we have obtained of cutting log-wood at Campeachy and Honduras; a privilege we could never before obtain in all our treaties with the court of Madrid. Nay, they would go as far as Aſia, and have the confidence to tell us the advantages we have gained there, and ſtill retain, will enable us to rival all the Eaſt India companies of Europe, as we have ſo compleatly ſecured the Nabobs intereſt and good opinion; have deſtroyed the trade of the French there ſome years, notwithſtanding the reſtitutions made them, and as the Dutch are there upon the decline. In anſwer to this, it will be only neceſſary to obſerve, that our preſent trade to Canada is ſo far from being of that importance it is repreſented, that thoſe who

have dealt in the peltry of that country, ſince we have been poſſeſſed of it, have been loſers, by reaſon of the full reſolution taken by the Hudſon-bay company, to underſell individuals in every article they deal in; ſo that till ſome regulation is made upon this head, this trade is not likely to produce the promiſed happy effects.

As to our trade to Senegal, it certainly is a very advantageous and lucrative one, and will neceſſarily lower the price of printed cotton and linens, as ſo great a quantity of the gum coming from thence is uſed in thoſe manufactures, and as this can now be bought at ſo ſmall a proportionate price to what we uſed formerly to pay foreigners. But as a monopoly of this trade has been *promiſed* to a certain conſiderable dealer, we cannot reaſonably expect he will have the good of his country ſo much at heart, as to preponderate againſt his private intereſt, and prevail upon him to ſell this commodity at its preſent low price.

The privilege of cutting and ſhipping logwood at Honduras and Campeachy, without annoyance or interruption, is certainly an object of ſome conſequence to the Weſt Indian traders; but as the point ſo much contended for under Sir Robert's adm——n, (which to be ſure he could not obtain, any more than the privilege now granted) of *no ſearch*, is not

not acquieſced to, we imagine this trade will not be productive of thoſe great emoluments which were at firſt expected from it, as it is well known, it is the interloping trade of negroes to the Spaniſh main, which are paid for in hard dollars, that makes this trade ſo lucrative and deſirous. As the Spaniards are perfectly acquainted with this circumſtance attending the logwood trade, it is not to be expected they will ever give us a public grant of a thing ſo detrimental to them.—But the object ſtill remains.

I muſt acknowledge, I believe our Eaſt India company is at this time the moſt opulent and beſt eſtabliſhed of any in Aſia, and that the reduction of Pondicherry, and the other French ſettlements there, muſt greatly interrupt their trade for ſome conſiderable time: but as it has long ſince been a moot point, whether our Eaſt India trade, as it is now carried on, though of infinite profit to individuals, is of any real ſervice to the nation; ſo, till this is decided, it will be impoſſible for me to perceive the advantages we can reap, as a people, from our ſucceſſes, and the preſent thriving ſtate of our affairs in Aſia.

Thus, my Lord, you ſee the pretended emoluments we are to expect from the acquiſitions and reſtitutions we make by the peace, however pompous an appearance they may

may parade upon paper by the writers of your party, loſe the very ſemblance of advantages, when put to a cloſe and impartial examen.

It is evident, *from what I have ſaid*, that we have more lands in our poſſeſſion than we ſhall people and cultivate, unleſs, with our uſual friendſhip and politeneſs, we provide for the Germans better than their own princes and maſters will, and make an emigration of ſome thouſand more Palatines to America, in furniſhing them with all the neceſſaries both for their voyage, and future ſettlement. This would be but common gratitude in us, as we have conquered *America* in *Germany*, to *enable* the conquerors to retain their acquiſitions; and who ſo proper as a colony of *Brandenburghers*, who have ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed themſelves as ſoldiers and Proteſtants this war? This would be a meaſure highly eligible, if there were not reaſon to fear ſome *future* ambitious king of Pruſſia might diſcover a prior right than us, or the French, or the natives, to thoſe lands, and ſupport his claim by the loyalty of his ſubjects upon the ſpot.

Our trade to Canada, ſo far from being a benefit to the nation, appears evidently a loſs to individuals, and muſt continue ſo, as long as the Hudſon's Bay company are premitted to monopoliſe at one time, and underſell at another,

another (for ſiniſter reaſons) the fair and open trader, who, without combination, cannot long carry on a loſing traffic.

The commerce to the iſland of Senegal is of little or no conſequence, as gum, which is its principal commodity, can be an article of no great import, without it be to the linnen manufactures.

The privilege granted for cutting and carrying away logwood at Honduras will only prove an encouragement to a parcel of infamous freebooters ſettled there, who living a moſt abandoned and profligate life, are a ſcandal to the people from whom they are an outcaſt.

And as to the advantages the Eaſt India company will reap from the peace, and the preſent flouriſhing ſtate of their affairs in Aſia, as that is a moſt deſtructive monopoly, draining us of our ſilver, both ſpecie and bullion, for unwholeſome herbs and crockery ware, ſo the more thriving and extenſive their trade is, the more pernicious it muſt prove to the nation.

After this, my Lord, I think your moſt zealous advocates for the advantages we gain by the preliminaries, muſt be forced to avow them merely chimerical, whilſt the diſhonour we ſuſtain by making the important reſtitutions is and ever will be indelible. Perhaps, my Lord, ſome of your partiſans may aſk, how came it that ſo many of the reſignees ſtill condeſcend-

ed to remain in poſt after the preliminaries were ſigned, and even ratified? They could not be ignorant of their contents, or the ſuppoſed diſhonour that is thereby caſt upon the nation: why then did they not throw up their places upon their firſt appearance? Can Mr. T—, who was ſo ſtrenuous in recommending and defending the preliminaries the day they were canvaſſed in the H—e of C——s, be convinced of the diſingenuity of his reaſoning, or the fallacy of his own arguments? Or, are his eyes opened all of a ſudden by inſpiration, which has enabled him to diſcover the ſhamefulneſs and ignominy of the terms? Theſe queſtions may be very eaſily anſwered. Mr. T—, nor any other of the reſignees, ſince the ſigning of the preliminaries, were *then* acquainted with the tenor and drift of the *ſecret articles*—whoſe dangerous conſequences and malignant influence—no true patriot, no honeſt man would countenance.

I am ſorry, my Lord, to make uſe of ſuch harſh expreſſions; but I acknowledge the good of my country, which I have ſo greatly at heart, operating ſtrongly upon me, in the heat of argument, an unguarded word may eſcape me.

Had we carried on the war with the ſame ſpirit that we have theſe three laſt years, we might in a ſhort time have made ourſelves maſters of all Louiſiana, without being cooped

cooped up with that narrow boundary the Miſſiſippi, poſſeſſed ourſelves of all Cuba, St. Domingo and Hiſpaniola, and all the Weſt Indian iſlands without exception: then made a deſcent upon Terra Firma, and become maſters of all the Spaniſh provinces in South America. Having cut off this reſource to the court of Madrid, their forces would ſoon have languiſhed, and we might eaſily have turned the tables upon the Spaniards in favour of the Portugueſe, and ſoon brought the firſt under the latter's ſubjection. Having accompliſhed this great point, in favour of his moſt Faithful Majeſty, we might by the ſame means, that is, having all the trade and treaſures of North and South America in our hands, have enabled the King of Pruſſia to defeat all the wicked deſigns of the Empreſs Queen, and his other enemies againſt him and the Proteſtant cauſe. Thirty million of money would purchaſe all the inhabitants of Germany (though by the bye we have ſpent forty millions this war there, and are now juſt where we ſet out) which might ſoon have been brought from the new world; and having furniſhed his Pruſſian Majeſty with an army of 800,000 effective men, he would ſoon have been in a condition to dethrone her Imperial Majeſty, and we ſhould have had the ſatisfaction to ſee a Proteſtant Emperor of our own election. This great

ſtroke being effected in favour of the liberties of Europe, we ſhould then have had nothing to do but to attack the Grand Signior, dethrone him, and place a Proteſtant Prince upon the Ottoman throne. We then might have carried our ſucceſsful arms farther Eaſt, and in a ſhort time have made ourſelves complete maſters of Aſia — and then — what then? Why, like Alexander, we ſhould have mourned we had not more worlds to conquer.

However romantic this may at firſt appear, it muſt have been the neceſſary and inevitable conſequence of having puſhed the war with vigour, and not ſubmitted to the preſent inglorious terms of pacification. I know but two arguments that can with any face be oppoſed to this. The firſt is, that, before we had entirely accompliſhed this great plan of operations, our national debt might have been ſo immenſely increaſed, that we could not have been able any way to pay the aggregate intereſt, and the nation muſt have become abſolutely a bankrupt. The ſecond is, that had we ſucceeded to the utmoſt of our wiſhes, and gained every one of theſe dominions, we could neither have defended, or expected to have remained in quiet poſſeſſion of them, ſince we muſt have excited the jealouſy of all Europe, and even our own created Proteſtant Emperor.

In

In anſwer to theſe oppoſed arguments,

I believe it is a received maxim in politics, that no people, or ſet of people, either natives or foreigners, whoſe intereſt it is to ſupport a government, will ever (as long as ſuch their intereſt remains) either directly or indirectly undermine it. This being a ſettled axiom, that even *Machiavel* could not contradict, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that the greater number we intereſt in the fate of the nation, ſo many more we eſtabliſh friends to the ſtate. Now, as we have already gained the cordiality, *in this reſpect*, of about one million three hundred and ſixty thouſand individuals (at a hundred pounds a head) foreigners and natives, by the national debt; if we could increaſe it to three times the ſum of 136,000,000 l. which it now amounts to, we ſhould make ſure of the greateſt, that is, the richeſt part of Europe, as our attached and certain friends; which might eaſily be done by purſuing the war for *only* twenty years,—a belligerant period of no great extent, conſidering the forty years war we often read of in the annals of *Brandenburg*. With reſpect to the intereſt of the national debt, if that ſhould amount to more than we could conveniently pay in ſpecie, which it might eaſily do upon theſe princi-

ples,

ples, conſidering we are only reckoned to have about twelve millions in all Great Britain; it would be neceſſary to create a ſufficient number of additional *Bank bills*, and other paper currency, which fully anſwer the intent of ſpecie, are more portable to individuals, and leſs burthenſome to the ſtate. And, if it ſhould ever be though expedient to pay off the *national debt*, *not with a ſponge*, we have always projectors in ſuch numbers to aſſiſt us, that the thing might be done *by calculation* in a fortnight. *Henriques* will throw as many figures upon paper, as will fill a ſheet in an inſtant, and in another divide them into ſo many parts, that there will ſcarce be left a ſhilling in the pound—and *Maſſy*'s ſliding rule will multiply them into farthings, before we know whether they are pounds, ſhillings or pence.—Such geniuſes are uſeful to a ſtate; I wonder they do not meet with greater encouragement.

As to the ſecond objection, when once we had made ourſelves maſters of all America, Aſia, and I might throw in Africa, with the connexions and poſſeſſions we ſhould then have in Europe; we certainly ſhould be a match for all the Princes of Europe leagued together, and, in deſpite of all jealouſy and envy at our ſucceſs, they would find it their true intereſt to keep in with us, leſt we ſhould ſerve them juſt as we had ſerved the other

other three parts of the world: ſo that France, Spain, Ruſſia, and even the Proteſtant Emperor himſelf, notwithſtanding his craving and enterprizing ſpirit, would be glad to court our friendſhip, if not pay us tribute. The difficulty of peopling and defending theſe vaſt poſſeſſions, I acknowledge is not ſo eaſily got over—but as we might embody the militia of Africa, and march the trained-bands of Aſia, if neceſſity ſhould require, by incorporating a few of our regulars with, and eſtabliſhing a proper diſcipline in thoſe quarters, this obſtacle would not be inſurmountable; eſpecially as our continental friends, ever ready at emigration, would flock thither in ſhoals upon the leaſt encouragement. The Germans would certainly be glad of any other country, ſince they will not defend their own, without being paid for it by foreigners, who have no intereſt in their protection.

Our miſſing of theſe great and extenſive conqueſts may, my Lord, be looked upon amongſt the moſt ſtriking diſadvantages of patching up this raſh and precipitate peace. It is true, they cannot be conſidered as more than negative diſadvantages, whilſt the benign influence and bleſſings of tranquillity are ſure and permanent—nouriſhing our manufactures, cheriſhing our trade, and circulating our riches to every corner of the iſland;

iſland; but then, how far greater would have been this circulation; how much more extenſive would have been our exports! and how ſtill more flouriſhing would have been our commerce to every quarter of the globe.

It were needleſs to labour at any argument to evince this; common ſenſe muſt at the firſt glance prove it to every man's underſtanding; and if the members of the oppoſition ſhould be hard driven to aſſign a reaſon for their reſignations and attack upon your Lordſhip's adm——n, they may always have recourſe to this invincible and ſolid argument, the *negative loſs* of all Aſia, Africa, South America, and the remainder of the Weſt Indian iſlands.

I believe, my Lord, you will labour under no ſmall difficulty, when called upon, as *doubtleſs you will be, by public* inquiry into your adm——n, to vindicate this part of your conduct; not to mention ſuch other points of *malverſation* as I have already cited. In this dilemma, I think the moſt friendly advice that can be given you, would be to retire from power and employment, into the moſt ſequeſtered part of Scotland, and there, by a recluſe and penitent life, make all the atonement in your power for the manifold ſins and crimes you have been guilty of towards G—d, your S——n, and the Nation.

This

This might carry the air of envy, and a desire to supplant you in some important post, had I not already so clearly set forth the causes of our disgust, and the full resolution of every man of us not to *submit* to let ourselves be appointed to any place, however important, however lucrative. The present opposition avows the same principles, and acts upon the same generous and national plan of all the great oppositions since the revolution, who having nothing but the real good of their country at heart, could never be biassed by personal interest, deluded by profits, or seduced by titles; it would therefore be fruitless to attempt silencing us by a ribbon or a place—we soar above such mean influence.

It is publickly reported, that your Lordship intends to use your interest to take off the late additional tax upon porter, so burthensome to the poorer sort of people, particularly labourers, to whom it is both food and nourishment, in order to lay it upon some article that is not so immediately connected with the necessaries of the working part of the nation. Indeed it is said that your Lordship strenuously opposed this tax at the time of its being laid on, representing the hardship it would be to the mechanical world, and was inclined to produce the sum required by an additional impost upon rum and melasses, articles of luxury and superfluity; but that

for ſome private conſideration, this was rejected. Doubtleſs, this popular meaſure, your Lordſhip has been excited to, in order, if poſſible, to wean the publick from that prejudice and diſguſt they have to you and your adm——n: but can it be believed that the people of England will ever approve the conduct of a *Scotchman*, when even his fellow countrymen, and thoſe of ſome rank in the ſtate, unite againſt him, not through any perſonal pique, private reſentment, diſappointed ambition, or in the expectation of *oppoſing* themſelves into power or office; but merely and ſincerely for the good of their country, which they have ſo tenaciouſly at heart, and to fruſtrate ſuch dangerous and deſtructive meaſures as your Lordſhip has lately purſued, and I have taken upon myſelf thus to expoſe in vindicating the conduct of the members of the preſent *glorious Oppoſition*.

If this ſhould any way look like an acknowledgment, that it were poſſible for a *Scotchman* to be honeſt and patriotic, and ſuch a conceſſion were to be made in favour of the four Scotch Members of the oppoſition; it would be neceſſary to obſerve at the ſame time, they are the only exception to the general opinion ſo univerſally and juſtly entertained of that nation.

It were almoſt unneceſſary at this time to remind your Lordſhip, of what has been ſo

often

often and loudly complained of by every Engliſhman and Hibernian, who has been diſappointed of promotion during this war: I mean the ſtriking partiality in favour of the Scotch. This object alone, one would have imagined, ſhould have prompted you to have purſued the war at all events, till ſuch time as you had amply and compleatly provided for all your friends, on the other ſide of the Tweed. I ſay, my Lord, from this conſideration, one would have imagined, a French and Spaniſh war would have been the moſt eligible meaſure for the ſecurity and ſupport of your adm——n, though additional ſupplies had been ever ſo difficult to raiſe, and though honourable terms of accommodation had been offered on the part of the belligerant powers. It is true *even then*, you never would have been able to gain over the four Scotch members of the oppoſition, but perhaps ſome indirect method might have been found to have ſoftened their reſentment, by providing for ſome of their friends and relations in the army and navy. This may indeed, my Lord, be looked upon as a great overſight in your politics, at a time you ſhould have taken every poſſible ſtep to inſure your tottering power, eſpecially amonſt your fellow countrymen, whoſe oppoſition muſt convey a very unfavourable idea of your conduct and deſigns. Such miſtaken policy was a ſure pre-

ſage of the blunders and inattention to our proper intereſt which we were to expect at the hands of ſuch a ſtateſman in the framing of a peace.

As this *grievous* complaint is now in a great meaſure at an *end*, by reaſon of the pacific meaſures that are taking place: ſo we are rather led to conſider the conſequences of your not more amply purſuing it, than to manifeſt our reſentment at your former partiality; a partiality ſo great, that we have always ſeen Scotch troops employed upon the moſt arduous and dangerous enterprizes, whereby you furniſhed them with an opportunity of ſignalizing their courage and vigilance in ſo ſtriking a manner, as to give colour to many promotions, which looked like a recompence for their paſt ſervices. By theſe glorious occaſions, you enabled them to riſque their lives in purſuit of honour and preferment, which many Engliſh and Iriſh officers, for want of theſe *favourable* opportunities, could not gain.

As this channel of national partiality is now ſtopped, we muſt expect to ſee it ſtream in other courſes: all Canada, will perhaps, be ſettled by Scotchmen, eſpecially if the Engliſh ſhould not chuſe to flock there in numbers ſufficient to people and cultivate ſo cold and extenſive a country: we may expect to ſee half a dozen more new bridges

erected

erected over the Tweed—All foreign ſnuffs prohibited, and nothing but Scotch allowed to be taken, even at court; nor need we be ſurpriſed if her ——— ſhould appear the next birth-day, in plaid colour ſilk, to make it a reigning faſhion; or that a jaunt to Edinburgh ſhould be as common as one to Kew. One of the writers on our ſide of the queſtion, has indeed, ſuggeſted, that if things went on ſo ſwimingly for a few years in favour of Scotland, we might expect to ſee a Royal Palace built there for the fixed reſidence of the court; but this I cannot perſuade myſelf, will take place any time theſe ten years, conſidering the preparations that muſt be previouſly made.

The writer of the North Briton, our favourite author, has ſo *amply* and *decently* evinced the political tenets of the preſent Tories (in one of his late diſquiſitions *) that it is matter of wonder and aſtoniſhment to me, how they will ever be able to anſwer him, or henceforward hold up their heads. He has clearly proved, that they would certainly have joined the rebels, both in 1715 and 1745, if their courage had been equal to their affection for the Pretender. Another reaſon might, I think, with due ſubmiſſion to that learned writer, be aſſigned, is, that their regimentals were not ready in time, by reaſon of the number of journey-

* Saturday, January 8.

journeymen taylors then employed in bearing arms. They would, nevertheleſs, certainly have marched to join the rebels in 1745, if their arms and ammunition had not been ſo opportunely ſeized in Lincoln's-Inn-Fields Playhouſe. It is, however, a happy conſideration, that they have not courage ſufficient to ſupport their evil deſigns in the field; as, however deep their political machinations may be, however notorious their principles and attachments, and however numerous their body, their *poltroonery* will always keep them in due ſubjection.

There is one circumſtance, which the North Briton has in this Portrait of the modern Tories, ſo nicely touched upon, that nothing but the pencil of ſo great a maſter, could ſo judiciouſly have hit off; I mean the entire reformation of the political principles of the Tories, during Mr. P—'s adm——n. He does not, indeed, aſſign any reaſon for this *extraordinary temporary* change, which clearly evinces the Tories are attached to *men* and not *meaſures*.

I may, indeed, be aſked, ſince this writer has ſo amply proved all the Tories rank Jacobites, and every one of them deſirous of bringing in the Pretender; how came it that knowing by experience, and convinced of their principles, we ever united with them in the ſame adm—n, in the purſuit of the ſame objects

objects, in ſupport of the ſame Prince? In anſwer to this, let it be remembered, that it is not individuals but expedients we oppoſe. In one word, we chimed in with the *Tories* till the loſs of *Newfoundland* (which ſo greatly ſlurred the reputation of the Scotch M—r) till their avowed arbitrary tenets, which I have already mentioned, became manifeſt, and the preſent inglorious peace took place.

I have not in this place inſiſted upon the negative diſadvantages we ſuſtain by a ſuſpenſion of arms in the four quarters of the world, or the imputation of ingratitude we ſhall lay under by all Europe, for having brought the King of Pruſſia into this war, and left him in the lurch—without attending to thoſe glorious motives—the ſupport of proteſtantiſm in the empire, and the ballance of power, in purſuit of which we have ſo zealouſly raiſed our national debt to 136 millions. By this one ſtep we have given up all future pretence to determine the quarrels of the princes of Germany, a privilege we have never yielded to any other power ſince the revolution.—This claim, which we have ſupported for almoſt a century at the price of ſo much blood, and treaſure; which we have hitherto conſidered as much our birth-right as the ſovereignty of the ſea, we have thus ingloriouſly yielded, thus puſilanimouſly given up.

If after this, my Lord, you ſhould not be con-

convinced of the upright motives, which have influenced the preſent Whig oppoſition —of the impracticability of ever regaining their affection, or re-uniting with them—if you ſhould not be convinced of the impropriety, diſadvantage, and danger, (to ſay no worſe) of thel eading rule of your admin—n, in granting your S——n the full liberty of naming his own ſervants, and keeping them in power as long as they pleaſe—if this unconſtitutional prerogative (never before allowed any prince of the houſe of H——r upon the Britiſh throne) ſhould not appear to you in its moſt glaring and baneful light—if you ſhould not be convinced of the diſhonour of the terms of the preſent peace, with the *ſecret articles* ſuppreſſed to public eyes: in a word, if your Lordſhip, ſhould not, immediately, upon your reading this, inſiſt upon reſigning your employments, that more able, faithful and popular M——rs may take the reins of government into their hands; you muſt be callous to all conviction, blind to your own perſonal ſecurity, and reſolved to complete the ſacrifice of the nation, So that, if it were not impoſſible, it would be fruitleſs in me to urge theſe points any ſtronger, or diſplay the contraſt of your and former adm——ns. But, being convinced of the force of my reaſoning, and the likelihood there is of your taking my advice, I ſubſcribe myſelf

Your's &c.

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